Here's a lovely sample in which he explains some of the difference between the two views.
Concentrating on the need to stop the regress of derived intentionality with a diminuendo, not a crescendo, I passed over--glissando, to continue the leitmotif--the issue of a community of communicating robot-makers as if it might be a local accident of history, rather than a constitutive requirement, but I now see no reason not to agree that Brandom is right about this--but not that the story ends where he ends it. I am willing, that is, to put in a major fermata at the place in the development where community comes in, and help myself to much of Brandom's book to provide an analysis of thisHere's another sample. I love it when Dennett oversimplifies because it almost always serves to clarify:
Oversimplifying somewhat, the distinction Brandom sees between my naturalistic way of 'collapsing' intentional normative status and his way of avoiding the regress can be captured by the supposed contrast between the violated norms of faulty design (my way) and the violated norms of a social transgression (his way). Roughly, it's the difference between being stupid and being naughty.The question Dennett whats to ask is which comes first. According to Dennett's critique, you can't help yourself to 'naughty' until you've explained the role of 'stupid.' I need to read Brandom's book to see whether he, in fact, is involved in a 'flight from naturalism,' but given Dennett's review, Making It Explicit must be full of valuable insights.
Essay on Robert Brandom, Making it Explicit Daniel Dennett July 31, 2006 The Evolution of A Why? @
Posted by garns at 11:39:23. Filed under: Philosophy
Facebook me!
Comments
Add Comment